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Origin of the Rule
It is not proposed simply to add one to the long line of discussions of
the refinements which present themselves in connection with the Rule in
Shelley's case. These discussions have entertained and divided legal thinkers
at intervals over the last six hundred years, the most notable instance being
the controversy that arose in connection with the views of Lord Mansfield
in the famous case of Perrin v. Blake.' Feeling then ran so high that it
was said by Lord Campbell in the Lives of the Chief Justices that the bar
of the entire kingdom was divided into factions for several years known as
Shelleyites and Anti-Shelleyites. It is, of course, well known that in this
difference of opinion the Shelleyites prevailed in England, Jesson v.
Wright,2 and Roddy v. Fitzgerald; 3 though in the opinions in the latter case,
as well as as in Jordan v. Adams,4 the wisdom of the Rule was questioned
by at least some of the members of the court. The Rule itself, however, has
never been departed from in England. On the other hand, in the United
States, in possibly half of the states, statutes have been passed which by one
method or another abolish the rule, showing, of course, the distinct trend.
against the Rule in this country in many directions. What is proposed in this
article is the less ambitious but (it is believed) the more fundamental inquiry,
namely, that of restating the problem in its simplest terms, inquiring into the
rationale of the so-called Rule, and then making a few suggestions as to the
desirability of the Rule under the different economic and social conditions of
twentieth century life.
To start with, the two simplest and most familiar illustrations will be
taken. Suppose that a testator by will in the fourteenth century devised
Whiteacre to A for life and after his death to his heirs. Suppose further
by the same will he devised Blackacre to B for life with remainder to the
heirs of his body (as the date is before the statute of wills, it will be assumed
that the land was situated in a jurisdiction where the right to devise by will
existed by custom). The first, and it is believed the main, inquiry is: pre-
cisely what did the testator mean by these apparently simple provisions? It is,
of course, obvious that in both cases he meant that A should enjoy the prop-
erty during his (A's) life; and in all the discussions which surround the Rule
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in Shelley's case no one has ever questioned this. The real controversy arises
with respect to the meaning of the -remainder to A's heirs in the devise of
Whiteacre and the remainder to the heirs of B's body in the devise of Black-
acre. The real question is, which one of the two following pictures did the
testator have in his mind? Did he, on the one hand, contemplate that
upon the death of A Whiteacre should pass to the person or persons who
happened to be the heir or heirs of A, and similarly that at the death of B
Blackacre should pass to the person or persons who happened to be the heirs
of the body of B, in each instance in their oun right? Or did he, on the other
hand, contemplate that when A died Whiteacre should pass to his heir or
heirs, and thereafter upon the death of such heir or heirs of A should continue
to descend to the heirs of A indefinitely, and in like manner in the case of
Blackacre did he contemplate that on the death of B Blackacre should pass
to the heir or heirs of his body, and on his or their death should still pass to
the heir or heirs of the body of B and so on ad infinitum? Without attempt-
ing to decide at the moment which of these two pictures the testator had
in his mind, it is, of course, obvious that if he had the second picture, the
only way in which the law could accomplish that portion of the testator's
wishes was to give A an estate in fee simple in the first case and B an estate
in fee tail in the second case. It is further obvious that if in order to carry
out the testator's wishes with respect to this portion of his devises the law
decides to give an estate in fee simple to A and an estate in fee tail to B, it
must necessarily in so doing disregard the original words of the two gifts by
which the testator has in terms prescribed that A, in the case of Whiteacre,
and B in the case of Blackacre, shall take only a life estate.
In order to understand the probable intent of the testator in such a
case in the fourteenth century it is necessary to remind ourselves of certain
economic and legal conditions which existed in that time but have been much
changed in the intervening centuries. One is the well known fact that at
that time conveyances inter vivos were very rare; under the Feudal system
they were accompanied by such heavy burdens as to make it very unusual
for the owner of land in fee simple to want to convey it. Further the right
to devise lands by will at that time did not generally exist, and indeed was
only made general by the Statute of Wills in the sixteenth century. Again,
lands at that time were not liable to the payment of debts of decedents, even
specialty debts. It follows from these facts that if lands were acquired by
A in fee simple, while theoretically he might convey them to some third
person, yet practically in perhaps ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the lands
which he owned in fee simple he held until his death, at which time they
passed to his heirs under the intestate laws. This entire situation is sum-
marized in the familiar fact that when lands were to be conveyed to A in
fee simple, the correct technical language was a conveyance to A and his
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heirs; it is, of course, elementary that A's heirs acquired no immediate inter-
est in the lands by such conveyance, and yet the fact that these words were
the technical words chosen to create a fee simple is conclusive evidence that
in those days a conveyance in fee simple was presumed to pass the title
on after A's death to his heirs indefinitely.
The rules of descent in force at that time and for many centuries after-
wards should also be borne in mind. It is, of course, well known that under
the common law rules of descent if A died owning lands in fee simple and the
lands thereupon passed to his heir B, that later upon B's death the lands
passed not to B's nearest heir but to the next heir of A, and so on ad infini-
tum; in other words the lands passed from A as the source of descent indefi-
nitely until such time as the descent might be broken by a conveyance from
the then holders to some third party who became a new source of descent
until his line of descent might again be broken by another conveyance.
Still another factor to be borne in mind was the common law rules
with respect to inheritance; under those rules, of course, the male heirs
inherited in preference to the female and the oldest male heir in preference
to younger heirs of the same rank.
Bearing in mind these familiar facts, was it more likely that the testator
or draftsman of his will in the fourteenth century when lands were devised
to A for life, remainder to his heirs, intended simply to benefit the person
or persons who might be A's heir or heirs at the moment of A's death, thus
making such heir or heirs a new source of descent of the lands in question,
or was it more likely, on the other hand, that he intended that A's heir or
heirs should take not in their own right but by descent from A, and that the
lands should pass on later upon the death of such heir or heirs to the person
or persons who might then be the heir or heirs of A? According to the Rule
in Shelley's case the latter is regarded as the real intention, and it is sub-
mitted that there is much to be said in favor of this view. The word "heirs"
in a jurisdiction where a single male heir always took to the exclusion of the
other male and female relatives in itself seems to imply that the testator had
in mind not a single gift to a single individual, but rather a series of succes-
sive gifts to those who might occupy the relation of heirs to A for the indefi-
nite future. Similarly in the case of the gift of Blackacre to B for life,
remainder to the.heirs of his body,-the familiar estate tail, of course, was
created by the technical gift to B and the heirs of his body; no one doubted
that in such case the heirs of the body of B were his descendants throughout
all generations, as opposed to his children; in the case therefore of a gift
after a life estate to B of a remainder to the heirs of his body, the implication
that the beneficiaries were intended to be B's descendants indefinitely and
successively was very strong. Still another argument pointing in the same
direction was the fact that at that time words of inheritance were necessary
to create either a fee simple or a fee tail; it was therefore no slight objection
to construing the word heirs in the first case or the expression heirs of the
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body in the second case as limited exclusively to the persons who answered
such description upon the death of A and B respectively, that there were no
words of inheritance attached to the gifts in the one case to the heirs of A
or in the other to the heirs of the body of B. Certainly if it was desired that
given individuals who occupied such relation to A and B should take either
estates in fee simple or estates in fee tail in Whiteacre and Blackaere, the
appropriate (and perhaps the necessary) way to bring about such result
would have been to devise Whiteacre to A for life with remainder to his
heirs and their heirs and assigns, and to devise Blackacre to B for life with
remainder to the heirs of his body and their heirs (if it was desired that
they should have a fee simple) or some appropriate language if it was desired
that they should have a fee tail in their own right.
Again obviously the objection to the successive view that this would
require giving A in the first illustration a fee simple and B in the second
illustration a fee tail contrary to the expressed intention of the testator that
they should have only life estate (which objection if the question were to
arise today for the first time would doubtless be a serious one) was largely
met by the fact above stated, namely that in the fourteenth century, whether
A got a life estate only or a fee simple, it was almost equally certain that the
land would pass at his death to his heirs.
Perhaps the real fact is that in this instance, as in so many other in-
stances in the law of property, it is a mistake which has frequently been made
to assume that a testator when making his will had a very definite intention
which the law must carry out; the real fact probably is that in many cases of
ambiguous language in wills, either the ambiguous language is due to a care-
less draftsman and adopted by an innocent testator who assumes that the
draftsman correctly carried out his expressed wishes, or if the testator has
drafted his own will, while he, of course, must have had a general purpose in
mind, it by no means necessarily follows that his purpose was sufficiently well
developed to cover such difficulties as those now being discussed. More con-
cretely, it is possible that in such a case the testator devised Whiteacre to A for
life with remainder to A's heirs and devised Blackacre to B for life with re-
mainder to the heirs of his body without thinking the matter through, so that
it is quite possible that if asked at the moment that he made the will whether
he intended the heir or heirs of the body to take as individuals in their own
right or to take successively through numerous generations from A or B, he
would reply that he had neither of these alternatives definitely in his mind.
The law, however, must assume that he had one or the other in mind, and
the Rule in Shelley's case assumes, and the writer believes with a strong
probability in favor of the propriety of the Rule, that the testator had a
succession of heir or heirs of the body in his mind, or at least that this is the
more likely alternative of the two.
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At this point the writer wishes to emphasize the thought that in his
judgment the sole justification for the Rule in Shelley's case.-is the belief on
the part of the court that in attributing this indefinite succession of heirs
or heirs of the body to the testator the law is really carrying out the testator's
wishes as nearly as it can. Manifestly in the case of the gift to A for life,
remainder to his heirs, if the law in the fourteenth century were to give
a life estate only to A with a remainder in fee simple to his heir or heirs,
what must happen would be that at A's death certain person or persons who
constitute A's heirs would then take a fee in their own right, and that the
fee (if fee he had) would pass at the death of such heir or heirs to his heir
or heirs as opposed to the testator's heirs. In other words, the only possible
way in which the land could pass in the first illustration to A's heirs indefi-
nitely and in the second illustration to the heirs of B's body indefinitely
Would be for the law to give A a fee simple in the first illustration and to give
B a fee tail' in the second illustration. The writer, therefore, strongly pro-
tests against the innumerable statements by courts and text writers to the
effect that the Rule in Shelley's case is riot a Rule of construction intended
to carry out the testator's intention, but a Rule of law or a Rule of property
which must be relentlessly enforced in spite of the fact that it does not carry
out the testator's intention. It is doubtless true that in every case where the
Rule is applied, that portion of the testator's intention which specifies that
the ancestor should take only a life estate is contravened when the Rule
gives the ancestor either an estate in fee simple or an estate in fee tail, as the
case may be; the point is that when the Rule does this, it is not willfully
flying in the face of the testator's intention, but on the contrary is disregard-
ing what it believes to be the less important part of his intention in order that
what it believes to be the more important part, namely, that the same shall
descend from the ancestor in fee simple or fee tail indefinitely, may be carried
out. The writer further believes that the use of the expressions "general
intent" and "special intent" so common in the discussion of this problem
is also undesirable; carefully analyzed, "general intent" seems to mean the
intent of a testator that the land shall pass indefinitely to the heirs or the
heirs of the body of the ancestor, whereas "special intent" refers to the
contradictory intent of the testator that the ancestor shall-have only a life
estate. It is true, as above pointed out, that the Rule in Shelley's case does
emphasize and carry out the supposed wish of the testator for the indefinite
succession as opposed to the expressed wish of a life interest in the ancestor,
but it is believed that the expressions "general intent" and "special intent"
do not convey to the mind the thoughts above referred to, and that the
terminology of the law would therefore be improved if these expressions
should be abandoned, and if the proper function of the Rule in Shelley's case
was stated to be, not a choice between a so-called "general intent" and "special
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intent", but the attitude of trying to carry out a somewhat contradictory will
in a way which on the %whole should come most closely to carrying out the
intention of a testator whose entire wishes (though he did not know it) the
law is unable to carry out.
Perhaps this is the proper point at which to express the writer's strong
opinion that the sole object of the Rule should be (as above pointed out) to
carry out the intent of the testator as far as possible. A number of other
considerations are constantly referred to in the literature on the subject as if
they constituted adequate reasons for the existence of the Rule. One is that
it was adopted to protect the Feudal Lords from the loss of certain perquisites
attending the passing of an estate by descent which they did not receive
when the estate went by purchase; but it is conceived that this is not, or at
least should not be, treated as a proper consideration at all. If it were clear
that the testator wanted the land to go to the heir by purchase and not by
descent, as the testator had a clear right to so prescribe, the Rule would have
imposed a very unjust restriction on the power of the testator to dispose of
his own property which, it is submitted, can only be justified on the assump-
tion that the testator intended a successive inheritance; if the testator did
intend such successive inheritance then it of course followed that the heirs
took the property by descent subject to these feudal reliefs which were prop-
erly payable in such cases. Again, it is frequently suggested (originally by
Sir William Blackstone) that one object of the Rule is "to facilitate the
alienation of land and to throw it into the track of commerce one generation
sooner by vesting the inheritance in the ancestor." Judge Blackstone in
Perrin v. Blake seems to express his approval of such policy, but it is sub-
mitted that there is an obvious fallacy in this contention. It seems to pre-
suppose that the law does not permit the creation of a life estate followed
by a remainder, but, of course, that is not the case; it never has been a
part of the policy of the common law to describe or destroy life estates for
the purpose of removing clogs upon the alienation of land. Judge Weaver
in Doyle v. Andis5 seems to successfully explode the theory that the
Rule can be justified because the effect of it, where it is invoked, is to
facilitate alienation. Other similar statements may be found but will not be
separately discussed. The writer is firmly convinced that all such statements
are merely statements of the incidental effects of the Rule where it is applied,
but that the question whether the Rule should be applied (with whatever inci-
dental effects) is wholly a question of trying to carry out the testator's intent
as nearly as possible, and that the Rule must stand or fall, depending upon
whether it does accomplish this laudable purpose, and quite without reference
to the incidental effects of the application of the Rule.
r127 Iowa 36, iO2 N. W. 177 (195o).
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The cases heretofore considered have been the simplest cases, i. e., the
devise to A for life, remainder to his heirs and the devise to B for life,
remainder to the heirs of his body. It is, however, obvious that while the
words "heirs" and "heirs of the body" are the expressions which present
the question as to the desirability of the Rule in Shelley's case in the
plainest form, yet there are innumerable somewhat related expressions which
in their more complicated forms bring out further the attitude of the
courts with respect to the Rule in Shelley's case. In other words,
assuming that a gift to A for life with the remainder to his heirs should
give A a fee simple for the reasons heretofore discussed, and that a gift
to B for life, remainder to the heirs of his body should give B a fee tail
for the same reasons, yet a doubt may exist whether the same reasoning
should lead to the same conclusion in other cognate cases, as for example a
gift to A for life, remainder to his "heir"; or a gift to A for life, remainder
to his heir male; or a gift to A for life, remainder to his heirs in fee simple,
etc., etc. It is proposed before taking up the cases in Pennsylvania to briefly
consider how such related expressions have been dealt with in England, only
premising that the attitude of the courts in considering whether to extend
the Rule from its original case to these cognate cases will almost inevitably
depend upon the extent to which the courts really believe in the original Rule.
Manifestly those courts which firmly believe in the Rule will be inclined to
extend it to all similar cases unless it is quite clear that they do not come
within the spirit of the Rule, whereas courts which do not agree in the
value of the Rule itself, though bound to follow it in the simpler cases, will
be apt to seek grounds for discrimination in other cases not within the letter
of the Rule.
Further Development of the Rule
For reasons which, in the light of existing conditions, seem to have
been quite adequate, the Rule in Shelley's case seems to have at first met the
unanimous approval of the profession. It is well known that the principle
of the Rule was applied as early as 1324, although the Rule was not in terms
stated in the short opinion in the year books. It seems to have been tacitly
applied in several other cases before Shelley's case itself, where it was dis-
cussed and formally adopted. In its simplest form, at least when formally
adopted, it seems to have encountered no opposition. But almost imme-
diately after its adoption the question arose as to whether it should be applied
to somewhat similar, though not precisely equivalent, facts. Suppose, for
example, land was devised to A for life, remainder to his heir male; or to
his heir for life, remainder to his heirs in fee simple; or to A for life, remain-
der to his heirs and their heirs and assigns; or to A for life, remainder
to his heirs as tenants in common; or to A for life, remainder to his heirs
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then living. These are simply a few of the many possible variations which
might arise and which, in fact, did begin to confront the courts almost from
the moment of the formal adoption of the Rule in Shelley's case.
It is quite obvious that in solving the problem whether the Rule in Shel-
ley's case should apply in these similar cases there were two possible methods
by which the courts might approach the solution of the difficulty. They might
either on the one hand say that the sole test whether the Rule should apply
was whether the language used by the testator, no matter what the express
words used, conveyed the idea that after A's death either all of his heirs
or all of his descendants were to take successively for all time to come; if
this were the correct principle it should be held that the Rule in Shelley's case
did not apply to any case where for whatever reason the testator shows that
either certain heirs or certain descendants should take in their own right and
to the exclusion of other heirs or other descendants of A. Or, on the other
hand, disregarding the principle above suggested, it might be held that the
Rule in Shelley's case should be extended to arbitrarily cover certain groups
of cases even though the testator did not intend his entire line of heirs or
heirs of the body to benefit; it should be carefully noted that this second
view is not a logical one based upon any principle, but an arbitrary one based
upon the thought that the Rule in Shelley's case produces such desirable re-
sults that the courts will apply it to analogous situations in spite of the fact
that the principle on which it was originally adopted admittedly does not
apply. It is proposed to examine a few leading cases in England in order to
try to determine which of these two points of view has found favor with the
English Court.
The first of these cases is Archer's Case.' There there was a devise to
A for life, remainder to his "next heir male" and "to the heirs male of the
body of such next heir male". It seems to have been conceded that the word
"heir", though in the singular number, was primarily equivalent to "heirs"
so that the Rule in Shelley's case would apply so far as the remainder to the
"next heir male" was concerned. The difficulty in the mind of the court
apparently grew out of the further words "to the heirs male of the body of
such next heir male". After careful consideration it was held that these
super-added words indicated that the person who might prove to be A's
next heir male was intended to become a new source of descent,. and hence
the Rule in Shelley's case did not apply and A took only a life estate with a
contingent remainder to his next heir male. It is subi'itted that this decision
was entirely in accord with the principle above stated, and if it had been
properly followed out in the later decisions the propriety of the Rule would
not have become questioned.
0I Co. 66b (1676).
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The next case toc which attention will be called is Perrin v. Blake.7 By
his will the testator devised the residue of his estate to a son John for life
with remainder to the heirs of his body, so that the Rule in Shelley's case
would obviously apply. The doubt was raised by the further provision
that "it is my intent and meaning that none of my children should sell or
dispose of my estate for a longer term than his life". John, claiming an
estate tail, suffered a recovery and the question before the court in a feigned
issue was the extent of John's estate under his father's will. It was held
by the Court of King's Bench, Lord Mansfield presiding and against the dis-
sent of Yates, J., that John took only an estate for life, but this ruling was
reversed by the Court of Exchequer Chamber which held by a vote of six
judges to three that John took an estate tail. The case raised very clearly
the question whether the expressed intent on the part of the testator that
A should have only a life estate was enough to prevent the Rule in Shelley's
case from being applied. Lord Mansfield seems to have been the proponent
of the view that there was something absurd in the law giving A an estate
in fee simple or in fee tail when the testator has quite definitely stated that
he should have only a life estate. The case gave rise to much discussion.
Mr. Fearne in his work on Remainders 8 bitterly attacked Lord Mansfield's
views, and Junius in one of his famous letters accused Lord Mansfield of
attempting to subvert the laws of England. It is submitted, however, that the
opinion of the majority of the Exchequer Chamber, and especially Judge
Blackstone's opinion reported in full in Hargrave's Law Tracts," show con-
vincingly that theRule was properly applied in that case. If in the simpler case
where land is devised toA for life, remainder to his heirs, the law in its wisdom
deems that it best fulfills the testator's wishes by giving A a fee simple which
might ultimately descend to all of his heirs, what real justification would the
courts have for distinguishing a case like Perrin v. Blake where the testator
has again devised land to A for life, remainder to his heirs, and then added
in effect his wish that the Rule should not apply? It is quite manifest that
if he knew of the existence of the Rule he did not want it to apply because
he said that A should only have a life estate; the only difference in Perrin v.
Blake was that he there said expressly (what he says impliedly in every case
where the Rule does apply) namely that he only wanted A to have a life
estate. If.the reasoning on-which the Rule is justified is sound at all, it is
submitted that it applies equally whether the testator expressly or impliedly
desires that it shall not; but it must not be forgotten that it is of the essence
of the Rule that though the Rule disregards the express or implied desire
that A shall have only a life estate, it does so only because to give A the
7
i W. B1. 672 (1769).
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larger estate is the only way in which the testator's intent that the estate
shall pass on through A's heirs, or the heirs of his body, can be carried out.
The next important case is lesson v. Wright.10 In that case the testa-
tor devised a certain piece of land to a nephew William Wright for life,
then "unto the heirs of the body of the said William, son of my said sister
Ann Wright, lawfully issuing in such shares and proportions as he the said
William shall by deed or will give, direct, limit or appoint and for want
of such gift, direction, limitation or appointment, then to the heirs of the
body of the said William, son of my said sister Ann Wright, lawfully issuing
share and share alike as tenants in common, and if but one child the whole to
such only child, and for want of such issue", then over.
The question was whether William had a fee tail which could be en-
larged by the recovery suffered to a fee simple, or whether (the Rule not
applying) William had only a life estate. The Court of King's Bench held
that William had only a life estate. This was reversed by the House of
Lords, Lord Eldon, writing one of the opinions, referring with approval to
the old statement of the Rule "that where there is a particular and a general
intent, the particular is to be sacrificed to the general intent." He admits
the force of the argument "that the appointment could not be to all the heirs
of the body in succession forever, and therefore that it means a class or
class of persons to take by purchase; that the descendants in all time to come
could not be tenants in common; that 'heirs of the body' in this part of
the will must mean the same class of persons as the 'heirs of the body' among
whom he had before given the power to appoint; and inasmuch as you
here find a child described as an heir of the body you are, therefore, to con-
clude that heirs of the body mean nothing but children." In spite of this
position, which seems to be an admirable exposition of the contention that the
words "heirs of the body" in the instant case should have been construed
as words of purchase, he nevertheless holds to the contrary on the ground
that "because children are included in the words 'heirs of the body' it does
not follow that heirs of the body must mean only children where you can
find upon the will a more general intent comprehending more objects." He
therefore concludes that it is clear that the testator intended that all the
issue of William should fail before the estate should go over, though regret-
ting his own decision. Lord Redesdale gave a concurring opinion; rejecting
the dictum that "the general intent should overrule the particular", he declares
"the Rule is that technical words shall have their legal effect unless from
subsequent inconsistent words it is very clear that the testator meant other-
wise." In passing, this principle is, it seems to the writer, exceedingly help-
ful, but on the question whether the technical words in the instant case, to
wit "heirs of the body", were not clearly intended to mean otherwise than
" Supra note 2.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
descendants, the writer is by no means persuaded that the decision is correct.
If the principle which has been proposed as the correct one upon which the
Rule in Shelley's case really should be rested is sound, i. e., that it exists in
order to carry out the testator's intent that the land shall pass indefinitely to
the heirs of the body of the first taker, has not a testator who has directed that
the land shall pass at the death of William not simply to his heirs of the body
but to his heirs of the body "as tenants in common" shown quite clearly that
if and when William died leaving children, instead of the land passing to his
oldest son to the exclusion of the other sons and daughters, the testator
desires that all his children shall share equally? Has not such testator clearly
shown that instead of William being a source of descent from whom all of
his descendants shall afterwards take in the order prescribed by the English
rules of inheritance, what he really wants is that at William's death his
descendants shall take in equal shares-which is something very different
from what an estate tail in William would give to his descendants? Finally,
if there were serious doubt on this score, is it not entirely relieved by the
further clause giving William a power of appointment among such heirs of
the body-which power certainly can not be exercised among all his descend-
ants and may therefore fairly be construed as limited to William's children?
It is earnestly contended that Jesson v. Wright, following certain earlier
decisions by the lower courts really unjustifiably extends the Rule in Shelley's
case beyond its original scope to a case where on any fair construction of
the will the testator's wishes are to be destroyed; the Rule of course avowedly
disregards the testator's will in every case to which it applies by giving
A a fee simple or a fee tail instead of life estate; this much the Rule may
properly do out of a desire to carry out in as broad a sense the wishes of the
testator, but the Rule seems to lack any justification if it be extended to
include a case where the application of it will not only give the first taker
a larger estate than the testator intended, but will do so in spite of the fact
that the result is to benefit the heirs or descendants of the first taker indefi-
nitely, whereas the testator did not contemplate benefiting them indefinitely
but only contemplated giving certain of them a new inheritable estate at
A's death.
The difficulties into which lesson v. Wright led the English Courts is
vividly illustrated in Jordan v. Adams." In that case a testator had devised
the lands in dispute to trustees for the use of William Jordan for life,
after his decease "to permit and suffer the heirs male of the body of the
said William Jordan to occupy the same or receive the rents and profits
thereof for their several natural lives in succession according to their respec-
tive seniorities or in such parts and proportions, manner and form and
amongst them as the said William Jordan, their father, should direct, limit
" Supra note 4.
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN PENNSYLVANIA
or appoint; and in default of such issue male of the said William Jordan",
to a brother, Richard Jordan, and his descendants. The Common Pleas
decided that William took only a life estate and this decision was affirmed
by an equally divided court, Barons Channell and Martin holding that
William took an estate tail whereas Justice Wightman and Chief Justice
Cockburn held that William took only a life estate. Baron Channell relied
principally on the dictum of Lord Redesdale in Jesson v. Wright, and con-
tended that the argument that the words "their father" in the power of
appointment showed that the prior words "heirs of the body" were to be read
as sons was unsound, because it would lead to the construction that "if
William Jordan had died having had an only son who had died in his lifetime
but had left a son who survived his grandfather such grandson would
take nothing under the will." Baron Martin repeated the same thought
and arrived at the same construction. Justice Wightman disagreed, saying
"though by the use of the words 'heirs male of the body' the testator may
be supposed to have intended to give an estate tail to the plaintiff, as those
words standing alone and unexplained by the rest of the clause would be
words of limitation and not of purchase, yet the subsequent words that they
(the heirs male) are to take the profits of the estate for their natural lives in
succession according to their respective seniorities or in such manner as their
father shall by deed or will direct, show too clearly in my opinion to admit
of doubt that the testator by 'heirs male of the body' meant the 'sons' of the
plaintiff who were to take in succession for life or in such parts and propor-
tions between them as their father should direct."
[To be concluded]
